Comments for Cognitive Sandbox http://cognitivesandbox.com Vegan cooking, unix tidbits and other minor discoveries Mon, 19 Dec 2011 20:32:34 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 Comment on The problem of group allocation by Brad Beattiehttp://cognitivesandbox.com/posts/the-problem-of-group-allocation/comment-page-1/#comment-748 Brad Beattie Mon, 19 Dec 2011 20:32:34 +0000 http://cognitivesandbox.com/?p=3052#comment-748 http://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~mehlhorn/ftp/ParetoMatchings.ps seems like a fantastic solution to this problem. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/301/01/2008sngphd.pdf might be even better. http://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~mehlhorn/ftp/ParetoMatchings.ps seems like a fantastic solution to this problem. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/301/01/2008sngphd.pdf might be even better.

]]> Comment on The problem of group allocation by Brad Beattiehttp://cognitivesandbox.com/posts/the-problem-of-group-allocation/comment-page-1/#comment-624 Brad Beattie Thu, 03 Mar 2011 01:28:38 +0000 http://cognitivesandbox.com/?p=3052#comment-624 The House Allocation Problem seems fairly related. The House Allocation Problem seems fairly related.

]]> Comment on Condorcet and later-no-harm by Brad Beattiehttp://cognitivesandbox.com/posts/condorcet-and-later-no-harm/comment-page-1/#comment-579 Brad Beattie Wed, 29 Dec 2010 03:43:27 +0000 http://www.cognitivesandbox.com/?p=2010#comment-579 This conversation crossed my mind again today. What I'd need to reconsider the benefits of range voting is hole in the following argument. <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_criterion#Range_voting" rel="nofollow">Range voting has a Nash equilibrium at the Condorcet winner</a>. By definition, this requires perfect knowledge and strategy for all voters, an unrealistic expectation. Furthermore, if a Condorcet winner exists and is not selected by range voting, some voters have not maximized their strategy and/or information gathering (i.e. some voters are at a systemic disadvantage that has nothing to do with their preferences). Condorcet methods, on the other hand, select the Condorcet winner by definition for naive elections and Nash equilibriums. It would then stand to reason that these methods are less likely to focus on how voters maximize their vote and more on who the candidates are. This conversation crossed my mind again today. What I’d need to reconsider the benefits of range voting is hole in the following argument.

Range voting has a Nash equilibrium at the Condorcet winner. By definition, this requires perfect knowledge and strategy for all voters, an unrealistic expectation. Furthermore, if a Condorcet winner exists and is not selected by range voting, some voters have not maximized their strategy and/or information gathering (i.e. some voters are at a systemic disadvantage that has nothing to do with their preferences).

Condorcet methods, on the other hand, select the Condorcet winner by definition for naive elections and Nash equilibriums. It would then stand to reason that these methods are less likely to focus on how voters maximize their vote and more on who the candidates are.

]]> Comment on Implementing Schulze STV by Brad Beattiehttp://cognitivesandbox.com/posts/implementing-schulze-stv/comment-page-1/#comment-553 Brad Beattie Wed, 25 Aug 2010 22:33:06 +0000 http://www.cognitivesandbox.com/?p=2461#comment-553 As a note for future reference, the Schulze proportional ranking mentioned in Markus' first comment has since been implemented: http://github.com/bradbeattie/Election-Web-Service/blob/master/schulze_pr.py As a note for future reference, the Schulze proportional ranking mentioned in Markus’ first comment has since been implemented: http://github.com/bradbeattie/Election-Web-Service/blob/master/schulze_pr.py

]]> Comment on Election Web Service by Cognitive Sandbox » Election API prototypehttp://cognitivesandbox.com/posts/election-web-service/comment-page-1/#comment-544 Cognitive Sandbox » Election API prototype Fri, 23 Apr 2010 17:00:57 +0000 http://www.cognitivesandbox.com/?p=2365#comment-544 [...] It’s up and available. #gallery-1 { margin: auto; } #gallery-1 .gallery-item { float: left; margin-top: 10px; [...] [...] It’s up and available. #gallery-1 { margin: auto; } #gallery-1 .gallery-item { float: left; margin-top: 10px; [...]

]]> Comment on Implementing Schulze STV by Markus Schulzehttp://cognitivesandbox.com/posts/implementing-schulze-stv/comment-page-1/#comment-540 Markus Schulze Tue, 26 Jan 2010 21:26:45 +0000 http://www.cognitivesandbox.com/?p=2461#comment-540 Here in Germany, I promote districts with 8-13 seats each, plus a proportional compensation on the national level. See: http://home.versanet.de/~chris1-schulze/schulze4.pdf http://home.versanet.de/~chris1-schulze/schulze5.pdf Here in Germany, I promote districts with 8-13 seats each, plus a proportional compensation on the national level.

See:
http://home.versanet.de/~chris1-schulze/schulze4.pdf
http://home.versanet.de/~chris1-schulze/schulze5.pdf

]]> Comment on Implementing Schulze STV by Brad Beattiehttp://cognitivesandbox.com/posts/implementing-schulze-stv/comment-page-1/#comment-539 Brad Beattie Tue, 26 Jan 2010 21:07:12 +0000 http://www.cognitivesandbox.com/?p=2461#comment-539 In practice, how many seats do you find are necessary for the results to match up in most cases? German parliament is something around 600+, but I start to notice a slowness when M>5. In practice, how many seats do you find are necessary for the results to match up in most cases? German parliament is something around 600+, but I start to notice a slowness when M>5.

]]> Comment on Implementing Schulze STV by Markus Schulzehttp://cognitivesandbox.com/posts/implementing-schulze-stv/comment-page-1/#comment-538 Markus Schulze Tue, 26 Jan 2010 20:39:44 +0000 http://www.cognitivesandbox.com/?p=2461#comment-538 The winners of the Schulze STV method are almost always identical to the first candidates of the Schulze proportional ranking. Therefore, when the number of seats M is large, it makes sense to recommend that the Schulze proportional ranking should be calculated and that the first M candidates of this ranking should be elected. Actually, here in Germany, I promote the Schulze proportional ranking method rather than the Schulze STV method. The reason: In Germany, house monotonicity is considered very important; and proportional ranking methods are house monotonic while STV methods are not house monotonic. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apportionment_paradox The winners of the Schulze STV method are almost always identical to the first candidates of the Schulze proportional ranking. Therefore, when the number of seats M is large, it makes sense to recommend that the Schulze proportional ranking should be calculated and that the first M candidates of this ranking should be elected.

Actually, here in Germany, I promote the Schulze proportional ranking method rather than the Schulze STV method. The reason: In Germany, house monotonicity is considered very important; and proportional ranking methods are house monotonic while STV methods are not house monotonic.

See:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apportionment_paradox

]]> Comment on Sesame ginger cookies by Momhttp://cognitivesandbox.com/posts/sesame-ginger-cookies/comment-page-1/#comment-535 Mom Wed, 06 Jan 2010 23:20:57 +0000 http://www.cognitivesandbox.com/?p=2269#comment-535 Thanks son...great cookies:) Thanks son…great cookies:)

]]> Comment on Pumpkin cheesecake cupcake by Brad Beattiehttp://cognitivesandbox.com/posts/pumpkin-cheesecake-cupcake/comment-page-1/#comment-219 Brad Beattie Sun, 15 Nov 2009 19:46:38 +0000 http://www.cognitivesandbox.com/?p=2261#comment-219 Yeah, I think so. The recipe originally had it in one spring form, but I didn't adjust the time/temperature at all. Yeah, I think so. The recipe originally had it in one spring form, but I didn’t adjust the time/temperature at all.

]]>